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FOREWORD
On January 13, 1993, in Paris, 130 countries signed the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to ban the entire class of
chemical weapons. Many of those nations have since ratified it.
In this country, debate continues on the strategic implications
of the convention, as drafted, and whether it is in the U.S.
national security interest. Once gain, that debate comes before
the Senate for ratification consideration in 1997.
@FOREWORDTXT = In the following monograph, Frederick Vogel
explores the historical, moral, and legal aspects of chemical
warfare, and the strategic implications of the convention,
including operational, policy, constitutional, and industrial
impact for the United States. He concludes that, although
"imperfect," the convention will contribute to U.S. national
security.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish Mr.
Vogel's monograph to inform the debate on this important subject.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION:
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Introduction.
On January 13, 1993, in Paris, 130 countries signed the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a landmark treaty which will
ban the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling,
retention and direct or indirect transfer of chemical weapons.1
On November 23, 1993, President Clinton submitted the treaty to
the Senate for its advice and consent, with a call for the Senate
to move expeditiously to ratify the convention.2
However, since submission of the convention and despite
intensive administration action to achieve the requisite advice
and consent, the treaty has languished in committee under three
separate sessions of Congress. The CWC, for which the United
States has been one of the principal proponents, has been the
subject of some considerable controversy. The debate continues on
the strategic implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention, as
drafted, and whether it is in the national security interest. The
author concludes that, although imperfect, the CWC represents a
significant contribution to U.S. security objectives, and
therefore it is in the national interest to proceed with
ratification and implementation. However, there are tangible
costs and strategic implications for the United States which must
be addressed.
Historical Background.
A 1960 Army Chemical Corps handbook on chemical weapons (CW)
states that "the annals of history show that down through the
ages man has sought to enlist the aid of chemistry and disease in
his conduct of warfare, but it was not until the 20th century
that science made it possible."3 A deeper analysis would prove
this statement to be not so. Toxic fumes were used in warfare in
India as early as 2000 B.C. and during the Sung Dynasty in China.
Thucydides recounts the use of poisonous fumes from burning pitch
and sulfur in the Peloponnesian War, during the seiges of Plataea
in 429 B.C. and of Delium in 424 B.C. Chemicals were also used in
warfare during the Middle Ages, as in the seige of Belgrade which
was saved from the Turks by the burning of noxious chemicals. At
the end of the 19th century, the English used artillery shells
laced with picric acid against the Boers, but this proved fairly
ineffective.4 The revolutionary scientific advancements of the
20th century brought chemical warfare to its highest, and
current, state of art.
The use of poison gas in warfare in its most invidious form
dates from its initial use in World War I at the battle of Ypres,
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April 22, 1915.5 Despite major international agreements
prohibiting the use of poisonous gases in warfare, by war's end,
some 1.3 million casualties, including 91,000 fatalities, were
attributed to the total of 124,200 tons of phosgene, chlorine,
and mustard gas used by all belligerents.6 Subsequently, chemical
weapons were used aggressively by Italy in Ethiopia in 1935-36.
Mustard gas bombs and aerial spraying caused most of the 15,000
reported chemical casualties, including an indeterminate number
of civilians who were intentionally targetted.7 The Japanese Army
used mustard gas, phosgene, lewisite and other agents
indiscriminately in China from 1937 to 1945, against both
unprotected military forces and civilians, in over 900 reported
incidents.8 Although chemicals were not otherwise deliberately
used by the major belligerents in World War II, poisonous gases
were used extensively by Germany in the concentration camps where
millions perished.
Egypt was later reported to have employed CW in the Yemeni
civil war (1963-67), during which phosgene and mustard aerial
bombs killed at least 1,400 people. Libya has also been accused
for years of having waged CW warfare in Chad. The most egregious
CW use of recent times, however, occured during the Iran-Iraq War
(1983-88) and in the Iraqi suppresion of its Kurdish minority
(1987-88). Although both Iran and Iraq used CW aggressively
against one another, Iraq used CW most effectively in breaking up
Irani mass assaults, and in targetting Irani border villages. In
its suppression of Iraqi Kurdistan, Iraq unwittingly provided the
single most compelling impetus to the CWC negotiations. On March
17, 1988, Iraq attacked the Kurdish village of Halabja with
suspected nerve agents, killing hundreds of civilian refugees.9
News reports of the attack, with graphic pictures of the victims,
caused universal revulsion and generated a worldwide demand for
elimination of chemical warfare.
The United States has also been accused in some quarters of
having waged chemical warfare in Southeast Asia, 1961-72, where
riot control agents and chemical defoliants and herbicides were
used extensively. The morality, legality, and medical pathology
of the U.S. use of chemicals remains a matter of continuing
debate.10 Also unresolved are controversial allegations of the use
of chemical agents ("yellow rain") by communist governments in
Southeast Asia against opposition forces and civilians, and by
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. These allegations have not been
confirmed, and subsequent investigation and physical evidence
have proved inconclusive on the "yellow rain" hypothesis.11
Chemical Weapons: Morality and Legality.

Morality. The quest for abolition of chemical weapons has
been driven in general by an almost universal revulsion of this
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entire class of weapons, and a perception, at least in the
Western democracies, that their use is somehow "immoral" in
comparison with other classes of weapons. Is this in fact the
case?
Just war theorists argue that among the seven conditions for
a just war is the principle that "the particular means employed
to wage the war must be themselves moral."12 Since the state has
the responsibility and authority to protect its citizens and
territory from unprovoked aggression, some theorists argue that
even immoral or illegitimate means may be employed if the
aggressor uses them first.13 The question remains, however,
whether chemical weapons are less humane than conventional
weapons, and hence proscribed on moral grounds. Again, some just
war theorists argue that chemical weapons, such as nerve agents,
kill quickly and prevent superfluous suffering,14 and as such are
not an immoral class of weapons. This is held in contrast to
conventional and nuclear weapons which can and have caused
horrendous suffering among combatants and, collaterally, within
noncombatant civilian populations. Thus the debate continues, and
the question of the morality of CW remains unresolved. This is
not the case for the legal implications of CW, for which there is
a lengthy historical record.

Legality. In general, the rights of states to employ any
weapon in warfare fall under two broad categories: specific
international agreements and international custom. Article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice notes that, in
addition to the general principles of law which pertain to all
civilized nations, there are two overriding principles of
international law: international convention, whether general or
specific, establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states; and international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law.15
Although the use of chemicals in warfare can be traced to
the earliest records, as noted earlier, concerted efforts to
legally constrain such use began only relatively recently. The
Brussels Declaration of 1874 and the Hague Conven- tions of 1899
and 1907, among others, banned the use of poison gas and poisoned
bullets. The Hague Gas Declaration of 1891 banned the use of
"projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases."16 Following the horrors of CW
use in World War I, the Washington Arms Conference Treaty was
signed on February 6, 1922, prohibiting "the use of asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or
devices..." France, however, objected to other provisions of the
treaty and it never went into effect.17 The 1925 Geneva Protocol
also prohibited the use of poison gas and bacteriological methods
of warfare. Although this Protocol had been adopted at the urging
of the United States, obstacles were raised at that time by the
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American chemical industry, Army chemical officers, and some
veterans groups.18 The Protocol languished in the U.S. Senate
until 1975 when it was finally ratified, with the reservation
permitting retaliation to an adversary's first use.19 However,
the United States continued to pursue a policy of renunciation of
CW, and at the Geneva Disarma-ment Conference of 1932, President
Hoover urged the abolition of all chemical warfare.20
In 1937, prior to the onset of World War II, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt stated:
It has been and is the policy of this Government to do
everything in its power to outlaw the use of chemicals
in warfare. Such use is inhumane and contrary to what
modern civilization should stand for. I am doing
everything in my power to discourage the use of gases
and other chemicals in any war between nations.21
In 1943, in the middle of World War II, President Roosevelt
further stated,
. . . I have been loath to believe that any nation,
even our present enemies, would or would be willing to
loose upon mankind such terrible and inhumane weapons .
. . Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the
general opinion of civilized mankind. This country has
not used them. I state categorically that we shall
under no circumstances resort to the use of such
weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.22
Roosevelt's reservation on "first use" reflects U.S. policy
as it has been interpreted since World War II, and as enshrined
in the U.S. reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It would
appear then that under the International Court of Justice
definition a case could be made that the use of CW is prohibited
by both international convention and custom. This recognizes, of
course, that both international convention and custom are perhaps
more often observed in the breach than in practice. For the
United States, at least, the questions of morality and legality
are blurred. There remains a visceral abhorence in the U.S.
Government and its population for CW, as there appears to be in
the Western and developed world in general. This may reflect
merely a cultural bias, as other cultures, non-Western, nonJudeo-Christian, ex-colonial peoples of Asia and Africa may take
issue with the Western imposition of its own morality.23 However,
the United States and others continue to codify in law their
right to employ this class of weapons in retaliation against an
enemy's first use.
U.S. National Policy on Chemical Weapons.
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In May 1991, President Bush committed the United States to
destroy all CW and to renounce the right to CW retaliation, the
U.S. long-standing reservation to the Geneva Protocol, once the
CWC enters into force.24 Earlier, in 1989, the United States had
declared a moratorium on further production of CW, and Congress
has since passed legislation requiring the destruction of the
entire U.S. CW stockpile by December 31, 2004.25 The United States
is thus effectively committed to elimination of any CW
capability, either for deterrence or retaliation. The U. S.
declared policy is to support the Chemical Weapons Convention as
a means to achieve a global ban on this class of weapons and to
halt their proliferation.26
In parallel with the negotiation of the CWC, the United
States has pursued bilateral agreements with the former Soviet
Union and the Russian Federation. These discus- sions culminated
in the signature of two interrelated agreements aimed at
eliminating the CW stockpiles of both parties.27 The first
agreement, the U.S.-Russian Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on
September 23, 1989, provides for a bilateral verification
experiment and data exchange. The purpose of the Wyoming MOU was,
and remains, to facilitate the negotiation, ratification and
implementation of the CWC.28
The second agreement, the Bilateral Destruction Agreement,
dated June 1, 1990, calls for the destruction and nonproduction
of CW and measures to facilitate the conclusion of the CWC as a
global ban on the entire class of weapons. The second agreement
has not been finalized and ratified, pending agreement on the
conversion of former CW production facilities in Russia. There
are also serious concerns over the technical and financial
capability of the Russian Federation to actually carry out a
comprehensive destruction program.29
In March 1994, the United States declared a stockpile of
31,000 agent tons of CW stored in nine locations, while Russia
has declared a stockpile of 40,000 metric tons, stored in seven
locations. There are serious reservations about the accuracy of
the Russian declaration, with independent estimates of the true
size of its stockpile as much as 80,000 metric tons or more.30
Both the United States and Russia have expressed serious
concerns over whether Russia can safely destroy its CW stockpile,
and a massive infusion of money and technology will be necessary
to do so. In January 1994, the two countries agreed to hire a
U.S. contractor to develop a comprehensive plan for the Russian
destruction program. Also, in March 1994, the U.S. Department of
Defense expressed its willingness to provide $300 million or more
to help build a pilot destruction plant in Russia, contingent
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upon Russian commitment to destroy its most modern CW bombs
there.31
The United States continues to work closely with the Russian
Federation on the CW destruction program and on implementation of
the 1989 and 1990 agreements. However, the U.S. General
Accounting Office has concluded that while some progress has been
made, significant technical, political, and financial obstacles
remain in implementation of the agreements.32
The United States has also pursued policy options to achieve
important counterproliferation objectives. These call for
measures to deny the means of producing chemical weapons through
export controls; deter CW production and storage by international
convention (i.e., the CWC); deny the utility of CW by employing
active and passive defense measures; and deter CW use by threat
of retaliation, including sanctions against offending states.33
Perhaps the most effective counterproliferation mecha- nism
developed to date is the Australia Group. This is an informal
forum of states, chaired by Australia, whose goal is to
discourage and impede CW proliferation by harmonizing national
export controls of CW precursor chemicals, sharing information on
target countries, and seeking other ways to curb the use of CW.
The group was formed in 1984 in reaction to CW use in the IranIraq War. The 28 members of the group, including the United
States, control a list of 54 chemical precursors and related
produc- tion equipment.34
By policy and practice, and independently of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the United States has in effect already
foresworn a CW capability. The United States, through unilateral,
bilateral, and multilateral efforts, has focused over the past
decade on minimizing the CW threat from potential adversaries,
reducing the proliferation of CW, and seeking an effective,
verifiable and truly global ban on CW. If all the world community
agrees on the nobility of that objective, why then is it so
difficult to achieve?
Putting the Genie Back into the Bottle: A First Try.
The horrors of poison gas, or chemical weapons, in World War
I were etched into the memories of the very governments which had
actively employed them, and the populations which had suffered
most from them. This prompted the international community to
negotiate the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which outlawed the use of
chemical weapons in warfare. However, the Geneva Protocol was
inherently flawed in that it banned only first use of chemical
weapons. Furthermore, many signatories, including the United
States, retained the reservation to retaliate in kind in response
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to an adversary's own first use. The Protocol also contained no
provisions for either enforcement or verification, and relied
primarily on the good faith of the signatories to deter chemical
weapons use.35 This good faith was ill-placed, and chemical
weapons use has been widely reported in regional conflicts
worldwide ever since, in contravention, if not in defiance of the
Geneva Protocol.36
Putting the Genie Back into the Bottle: A Second Try.
In recognition of the inadequacies of the Geneva Protocol,
on April 18, 1984, then-Vice President Bush tabled a draft treaty
on the comprehensive ban on all chemical weapons at the Genevabased Conference on Disarmament (CD). Although such a treaty had
been under discussion in the CD for many years, the U.S. proposal
was the first to call for a total ban on the entire class of
chemical weapons.37 This was a major foreign and defense policy
initiative at the time, and it was reemphasized by Bush as part
of his political platform during the 1988 Presidential campaign.
After almost another full decade of very difficult and highly
technical negotiations, on January 13, 1993 in Paris, 130
countries including the United States signed the convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the "Chemical
Weapons Convention" or CWC).38
Despite the active support for such a ban from all U.S.
presidents since Richard Nixon and the entreaty by President
Clinton for expeditious Senate action,39 the treaty has languished
in the Congress. Since the treaty opened for signature in January
1993, the Senate has failed to take action on it, despite
expressions of support and same political party control in both
the Senate and the White House. Although the treaty has raised
serious concerns among a number of key Senators and their staffs,
it has also suffered from congressional preoccupation with
domestic affairs and a general failure of both the public
leadership and private community to focus on such a technical and
esoteric issue.40
Why the Resistance?
President Clinton has said, "This treaty is one of the most
ambitious in the history of arms control, banning an entire class
of weapons of mass destruction. It is a central element of my
Administration's non-proliferation policy. The treaty will
significantly enhance our national security and contribute to
greater global security."41 In addition, the CWC furthers the
universal goal of preventing proliferation of chemical weapons,
and ultimately eliminating them entirely.42 Who could possibly
argue against that?

7

Perhaps the CWC goes too far, or not far enough. The CWC
goes beyond merely banning the use, including retaliatory use, or
threat of use of chemical weapons, but also prohibits the
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and
direct or indirect transfer to anyone of chemical weapons; the
engagement in military preparations to use chemical weapons; and
any assistance to any non-party in activities prohibited to
States Parties.43 The CWC also requires the total destruction of
all existing chemical weapons stocks, chemical weapons production
facilities, and abandoned chemical weapons stocks in third
countries.44 The convention further provides for the most
comprehensive verification and enforcement regime in arms control
history.45 It is on these two points that the contention has
arisen: the comprehensive nature of the convention and the
question of verification and enforcement.46
Critics have argued that the treaty cannot "go far enough,"
and will leave the United States vulnerable to rogue states which
either will not accede to the convention or will clandestinely
violate it. The convention could thereby subject U.S. forces and
allies to chemical weapons attack, without a capability to
respond in kind. Lacking a chemical weapons capability itself,
they argue, the United States will be unable to either deter
their use or retaliate proportionately. Furthermore, its critics
argue, the convention cannot be verified or effectively
enforced.47
Supporters, however, respond that "although no treaty is 100
percent verifiable, the CWC's extensive verification measures
will significantly increase the chances that a violation will be
detected, raising the political cost of illicit chemical weapons
activities and thus helping to deter them."48 Its rigorous
enforcement provisions will also significantly increase the
difficulty of acquiring chemical weapons and thus impede the
proliferation of chemical weapons by isolating the rogue states
which might refuse to accede to the treaty or violate its terms.49
All of this, supporters say, acts to provide the protection to
U.S. forces and allies which treaty critics have found lacking.
Furthermore, the convention has won the endorsement of senior
military leaders, including General John Shalikashvili, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who testified to the Congress that
the CWC is "clearly in the national interest." General
Shalikashvili stated that the CWC would render U.S. troops less
likely to face CW threats in future wars, and that the United
States did not need the option of retaliating in kind to CW.50
In fact, during the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. response to
the Iraqi capability to employ chemical weapons was, on the one
hand, to disavow any chemical weapons use, but, on the other, to
threaten "disproportionate response" to any Iraqi use. This was
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reportedly interpreted by Saddam Hussein as a threat to retaliate
with nuclear weapons.51 The deterrent effect of U.S. capability to
employ either massive conventional weapons or to threaten nuclear
retaliation (even though unstated U.S. policy had been to rule
out this option entirely) appeared sufficient to dissuade Saddam
Hussein from chemical weapons use. While the United States has
elected to forego a chemical weapons capability, treaty
supporters argue that its capability to respond
"disproportionately" as in Iraq would seem sufficient to deter
future chemical weapons use as well.52
Congress and U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy.
According to H. Martin Lancaster, Special Advisor (through
December 1995) to the President and the Director of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency on the Chemical Weapons
Convention, the CWC had only about a "50-50" chance of
ratification by the end of the last session of the Congress. The
problem was that the Congress is "disproportionately" preoccupied
with domestic issues and had neither the time nor the energy to
focus on the CWC. In addition, Lancaster stated that there were
critics in the Senate who were adamantly opposed to the treaty
and committed to killing it.
Lancaster stated that other political considerations also
had the potential to impede ratification of the CWC. He
emphasized that it would require some strong presidential
intervention to energize the Senate to focus on the treaty, but
that this was unlikely while the President was embroiled in
other, more pressing political battles. In 1996, both Congress
and the White House became even further distracted by the
presidential elections. It would have been a high political risk
at such a time for either the President or any member of the
Senate to expose him/herself on the issue of chemical weapons. In
addition, Lancaster opined that there was very little public
interest in the issue, thus little motivation for elected
officials to tackle it. Lancaster concluded that, ultimately, if
the treaty were not ratified in the last session of Congress,
then the "window of opportunity" to do so might be closed for
good. By the time the 1996 elections had sorted themselves out,
it would be too late in the chemical weapons destruction schedule
for the United States to comply. Without the United States as a
signatory to the CWC, Lancaster predicted that the treaty would
fail and become nothing more than a futile effort in a lost
cause.53
Cassandra-like, Prognosticating Woe.
And so now what happens since the U.S. Senate failed to
ratify the CWC? The author posed this question to Lancaster, and
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asked if this would signal a return to the "bad old days" of
unbridled proliferation and chemical weapons use. Lancaster
responded that such activity is a distinct possibility. He added
that while the CWC could survive the absence of Russia, it could
not survive without the accession of the United States. Without
active U.S. participation, the most fundamental premise of the
CWC, which is universality, is lost and the treaty becomes
untenable. Other states, in particular current and intending
chemical weapons possessors, can be expected to revert to form
and resume chemical weapons-related activities. Proliferation
will thus become more prevalent, and chemical weapons use,
including use against the United States and its allies, will
become inevitable. The treaty and its international organization
may survive for a time, but its collapse will become inevitable
and unavoidable.54
Counterpoint--Is the CWC an Adequate Instrument?
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) has made its
own studied assessment of the CWC as drafted, and remains
concerned on a number of significant points. On December 18,
1995, the author interviewed Mr. Marshall Billingsley, senior
staff for arms control on the SFRC, for the committee's views on
the CWC.
The committee's primary concerns are that the CWC in its
present form would in the first instance remove a flexible
deterrence option for the United States in the event of hostile
CW use against the United States or its allies, and would
eliminate any future capability for retaliation in kind.
Secondly, the CWC could prompt a reduction in spending on
defensive measures. Thirdly, and very importantly, Russia, the
world's preeminent CW power, has failed to initiate a
comprehensive schedule of CW destruction in the spirit of the
Bilateral Destruction Agreement.55
Specifically on flexible deterrence, the SFRC takes note
that in the absence of any CW capability for either deterrence or
retaliation, the United States will have no option to respond to
an adversary's CW use other than nuclear weapons employment. But
there is a limit to our nuclear capability. The United States is
committed to arms control measures governing nuclear weapons
stockpiles, with the final end-state numbers of U.S. nuclear
warheads set at the absolute minimum to satisfy U.S. national
security requirements with regard to nuclear deterrent strategy.
In the event of a future requirement to divert nuclear weapons to
CW deterrence or retaliation, there may not be a sufficient
nuclear capability remaining for the United States to respond to
a nuclear threat.56
Additionally, the committee questions whether the threat of
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nuclear retaliation would truly deter an adversary from CW use.
Those states or idealogical entities which pose the greatest CW
threat, such as North Korea, Iran, or terrorist organizations,
might not be swayed by a nuclear threat to their own or other
innocent populations, nor might they find a U.S. threat of
nuclear retaliation credible. Despite U.S. experience in the Gulf
War, in which Saddam Hussein appeared to have been deterred from
CW use by threat of nuclear retaliation, such success in
deterrence might not be replicated in the future, and there are
those of hostile intent toward the United States, waiting in the
wings, who may very well call the U.S. bluff the next time.57
On the question of spending on CW defensive measures, the
SFRC takes note of the general reduction in defense spending
among those countries now committed to the CWC. It appears that
these reductions will carry over into CW defensive measures as
well. The perception among the most hopeful signatories is that
the CWC will eliminate the CW threat, and therefore further
spending on CW defensive equipment, measures, and training will
no longer be necessary. The CWC thus has the potential to lull
signatories into a "false sense of security," and leave those
actually complying with the treaty more rather than less
vulnerable to CW threat or attack. The United States presently
retains an adequate CW protective capability, but that capability
could itself be eroded should too much faith be placed in the
good will of all CW-capable states. In addition, as our allies
reduce their own CW defensive spending, they could come to rely
more on the United States to provide protection, thus imposing an
increased burden on it.58
The SFRC is also concerned that Russia, the world CW
superpower, is not complying with its commitments to destroy its
CW stocks. In accordance with the Bilateral Destruction Agreement
(not yet in force), the United States and the former Soviet Union
agreed to a schedule of CW destruction which would totally
eliminate the declared CW stockpiles of both states. Although the
government of the Russian Federation originally stated its
commitment to the principles of that agreement, Moscow has
informed the United States that it does not have the money,
technology, or level of expertise necessary to undertake the
destruction of its declared stocks. There remains doubt and
debate over the actual size of the Russian stockpile, but some
experts believe it to be far greater than that which has been
declared. Furthermore, there are reports considered credible by
the SFRC that the Russian military has continued research,
development, production, and illicit diversion of chemical
weapons, in violation of the spirit of the bilateral agreements
and the CWC.59
The committee also believes that although the U.S. Chemical
Manufacturing Association (CMA) has voiced its support for the
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CWC, a number of significant cost and technical factors for both
the chemical industry and the U.S. Government need to be studied.
The verification regime itself, which provides for routine and
challenge inspections of chemical production facilities, could
become very costly. The CWC establishes an Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which shall be funded in
accordance with the UN scale of assessments (CWC Article III,
Para A.1.). However, the CWC further provides for "contributions
to the voluntary fund for assistance" to be administered by the
Technical Secretariat of the OPCW (CWC Art X, para 7.(a)). The
SFRC understands that the OPCW expects the United States, Russia,
and perhaps one other yet to be identified state to provide the
bulk of such contributions related to destruction.60
The committee is concerned that the verification regime will
be expensive for the chemical industry and will also pose a
threat to proprietary information. The CWC provides for managed
access to chemical facilities, which will allow some measure of
protection for the industry. However, it remains technically
feasible for an inspector on a formal OPCW routine or challenge
inspection to divert chemical samples for unauthorized analysis.
Such action could expose the U.S. chemical industry to loss of
proprietary information, thus allowing an advantage to
international competitors. Furthermore, the SFRC estimates that
costs of the technical inspections themselves will range from US
$50,000 to $70,000 per inspection.61 By contrast, the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) conducted a trial
inspection of a commercial facility producing schedule 3
chemicals in 1992, at a cost of approximately $5,000. ACDA
estimates the cost to industry of $4 million in the first year of
the CWC and less so in subsequent years.62
The committee further understands that many of the CWC
signatories expect conclusion of this treaty to help bring down
trade barriers, and ease controls on dual-use chemicals.
Inadvertently, the United States may find itself contributing to
hostile CW programs through facilitation of trafficking in
commercial chemicals.63
In general, the SFRC believes that the present state of the
art for verification is not adequate for the purposes of the CWC.
U.S. agencies have stated publicly that the United States cannot
verify, with confidence, the most stringent provisions of the
CWC, even with the most advanced national technical means. The
committee is concerned that while no treaty is completely
verifiable, the CWC is weakest in this area. In this context, a
false perception of security, i.e., an effective worldwide ban on
CW, could be more dangerous that a continuation of the perilous
status quo.64
Is the CWC then hopelessly flawed? Should the United States
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refuse to ratify? Mr. Billingsley said that, in fact, the CWC is
not a lost cause. The House passed a "Sense of the Congress"
resolution on June 15, 1995, and the Senate passed a "Sense of
the Senate" resolution on September 5, 1995, both urging prompt
ratification and implementation of the treaty. However, the SFRC
remains concerned that technical adjustments must be made to the
language of the treaty, to strengthen it and to provide greater
protection for U.S. interests, both government and industry. Mr.
Billingsley stated that the most likely scenario would involve
recommendations by the SFRC on specific adjustments to the
language of the treaty, as a condition for U.S. ratification. He
recognized that this would require renegotiation of the CWC in
the Conference on Disarmament, but he felt that this would be
necessary to satisfy the committee's and U.S. concerns.65
But Do We Really Need Chemical Weapons?
While the debate on the deterrent and retaliatory capability
of CW is certainly valid, perhaps the most fundamental question
is the combat effectiveness of this class of weapons.
Specifically, what is the advantage to the United States of
employing CW, and what is the hostile threat that an enemy use
them? As stated earlier, during World War I, more than a million
combatants were wounded by poisonous gas and some 90,000 died as
a result. These statistics, however, are misleading. U.S. forces
suffered 34,249 immediate deaths on the battlefield, of whom an
estimated 200 were caused by gas, with a further 1,221 dying in
hospital wards. The total number of wounded and evacuated was
224,089, of whom 70,552 suffered from gas and other wounds.66
The American casualty rate from CW appears to have arisen
from a lack of defensive preparedness. By the time of the U.S.
entry into the war, the British, French, and Germans had
developed fairly sophisticated training, doctrine, and equipment
to operate in a chemical environment. Consequently, their
casualty rates were far lower. By way of comparison, the Russians
had devoted few resources to CW preparedness and suffered
severely as a result. For example, in one attack in June 1915,
two Russian regiments suffered some 90 percent gas casualties. In
September and October 1916, almost 5,000 gas casualties were
reported in two separate incidents, and a later incident in 1917
caused over 9,000 gas casualties.67
The difference appears to be in preparedness. After the war,
British analysts reported that fewer gas victims died of their
injuries than from other weapons, thus allowing many to return to
full combat duty following convalescence. The analysts also
determined that gas caused a proportionately greater number of
casualties than high explosives, among unprepared troops, and was
more effective in demoralizing an enemy and reducing the battle
efficiency among such troops.68
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General John J. Pershing, in his Final Report on the
American experience in World War I, wrote that "Whether or not
gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture,
but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared (emphasis added)
that we can never afford to neglect the question." He concurred
with the British analysts who stated that while CW was a
significant factor on the battlefield, it was not a major cause
of battle deaths.69 Preparedness is thus the key to survival in a
CW environment. The consensus among analysts appears to be that
while CW use can be a serious impediment to combat operations, it
will not cause extensive casualties among properly trained and
equipped troops.
CW can equally impede the combat operations of the
belligerent employing them. During World War II, all
participating nations had developed CW capabilities, but the
Germans were technologically far ahead of their adversaries.
However, the Germans elected not to employ CW, even though they
reeled from attacks on all quarters. After the war, a senior
German CW officer, Lieutenant- General Hermann Ochsner, told his
Allied interrogators that CW had not been considered an efficient
weapon to support the doctrine of rapid movement of armies.
Although it could be effective against unprepared troops, it
restricted movement of one's own forces. As a result, CW was not
integrated into German military doctrine, training, or planning.
Furthermore, he stated that the Wehrmacht was under strict orders
not to move CW stocks outside of German territory for fear of
accidental use or capture.70 Aversion to CW use during World War
II arose partially from fear of retaliation and also from the
constraints of the much flawed 1925 Geneva Protocol: "Treaty
prohibitions, though imperfect, reinforced both public and
military dislike and fear of chemical warfare . . ." (Major R.J.
Brown, Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraints).71
CW, even for the prepared, is a potentially lethal nuisance.
This axiom applies for both the attacker and the defender, where
both or either have the proper training, equipment, and
discipline. Where then is the advantage of possessing or
employing CW? Is deterrence a factor when U.S. forces are already
prepared to operate effectively in a CW environment? Is
retaliation a factor when the potential adversary is equally
prepared, or does not care if his forces or population are
subject to CW attack?
For the United States, it would appear that CW is not a
particularly effective option for combat operations. At present,
the United States has already committed to destruction of its
entire CW stockpile and has foresworn CW use upon entry into
force of the CWC. No CW stocks are forward deployed, nor
effectively available for combatant commanders in the event of
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hostile threat.72 Even in the absence of the CWC, the United
States has no operational capability nor a credible deterrent or
retaliatory capability for chemical weapons.
The Nuclear Threshold.
A compelling argument often cited for retaining chemical
weapons is to provide flexible response to an adversary's first
use. The main point of this position is that in the absence of
CW, the United States will have no option short of nuclear
weapons to retaliate to hostile CW attack against U.S. or allied
forces. In the annual Global Wargame conducted at the Naval War
College in July 1995, such a scenario was developed and
participants recommended a nuclear response to CW employment.
During the exercise, the national command authority ultimately
declined this option, but concern remained that conventional
response would have been inadequate.73
The counterpoint to the flexible response argument is that
not everyone among our allies agrees on either the CW or nuclear
option. With respect to CW, for example, within NATO at least 13
governments have imposed stringent conditions on the shipment of
U.S. CW stocks to their territory in a crisis, and 6 have
insisted that they will never permit such shipments under any
circumstances. Others have asserted their right of veto.74
Germany, the only country in which U.S. CW was previously forward
deployed, required the United States to remove these stocks in
1990.75 It is reasonable to presume that other allies, in the
Middle East and the Pacific most prominently, would hold similar
ambivalence toward U.S. CW capabilities in their regions.
The conclusion is that a U.S. CW response, even if the
United States were capable of such, is not necessarily a viable
option. Moreover, the United States does not now possess such a
capability nor will it in the foreseeable future. This situation
prevails, whether the United States likes it or not. The United
States by policy has foresworn a CW capability, and must rely on
its massive conventional capability or nuclear response to deter
or retaliate against aggression. Consequently, should the United
States unilaterally disarm its CW capability, or should it ratify
the Chemical Weapons Convention?
The U.S. Constitution and The Role of Congress.
The Congress, within its constitutional authority, can exert
a decisive influence over the implementation of the foreign and
defense policy of the United States. The U.S. Constitution states
that, "all Treaties made . . . under the authority of the United
States" to be the "the supreme Law of the Land," binding on both
the Federal government and the various states.76 The Constitution
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further requires that all international agreements be subject to
the advice and consent of the Senate, two-thirds of whom are
present and voting.77 Congress has also indicated its desire and
intent to be involved in the approval of any serious arms control
agreements. Article 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of
1961 provides:
That no action shall be taken under this or any other
law that will obligate the United States to disarm or
to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of
the United States, except pursuant to the treaty-making
power of the President under the Constitution or unless
authorized by further affirmative legislation by the
Congress of the United States.
If full implementation of a treaty imposes a burden or
requirement on a private person, then Congress and the President
must also enact "implementing legislation."78 In the case of the
CWC, private U.S. citizens and chemical manufacturers will be
constrained from producing chemicals for "prohibited purposes,"
and in quantities beyond that "consistent with the intended
purpose."79 Reporting requirements will be imposed on the
manufacture of chemicals in general. In addition, broad access to
the private sector for both routine and challenge inspection will
be required. As such, the Congress will be required to enact
implementing legislation to provide the treaty full effect under
U.S. law.80
It is clear then that the Congress will have a definitive
and central role not only in the ratification of the CWC, and
U.S. accession to it, but also in the formulation of domestic
legislation to implement it in the United States. It will be the
responsibility of the Congress to ensure that U.S. implementation
of the CWC conforms to the Constitution and the law of the land.
The American Law Institute, in a 1987 Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law, provided the following analysis:
A rule of international law or a provision of an
international agreement of the United States will not
be given effect as law in the United States if it is
inconsistent with the United States Constitution. . . .
No provision of an agreement may contravene any of the
prohibitions or limitations of the Constitution
applicable to the exercise of authority by the United
States.81
However, even if a treaty entered into by the United States
is in violation of the Constitution, that does not relieve the
United States of its obligations under international law.82 This
apparent dichotomy emerges on the issue of routine and challenge
inspections and the Constitution's Fourth Amendment restrictions
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on searches. The question is how to reconcile U.S. domestic law
with its obligations under a Chemical Weapons Convention.
In the first instance, the Bill of Rights was created to
protect the people from actions of the Federal government and, by
extension, of the state governments as well. Secondly, the Fourth
Amendment protects "the people," not the U.S. Government itself,
and only "unreasonable" searches and seizures are prohibited.83
Thus, any facility of the U.S. Government could be inspected
under the CWC without further authority. Also, official
inspections by regulatory agencies of business premises licensed
by the inspecting agency are already authorized, and business
owners can be compelled to permit entry, without a search
warrant, as a condition for licensing.84 This would appear to
cover the chemical industry for both routine and challenge
inspection.
Challenge inspection for a facility or for private property
not specifically licensed for the purposes stated in the
paragraph above presents a more complex Constitutional question.
Such a search could require a finding of "probable cause" and
issuance of a search warrant.85 This process could be extremely
difficult and time-consuming, and would probably negate the
purpose and intent of a short-notice inspection. However, "the
fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent abuses
of power by the United States Government."86 A challenge
inspection conducted by the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on behalf of a foreign government does
not appear to violate the Fourth Amendment.87 U.S. ratification of
the CWC would not of itself imply an act of the U.S. Government.
In fact, the U.S. Government regularly and routinely cooperates
with foreign governments in carrying out international treaty
obligations, in acts which might violate the Constitution if
carried out by the U.S. Government on its own behalf (extradition
treaties, prisoner exchange treaties, for example).88
The above discussion is by no means intended as the
definitive analysis of the Constitutional issues posed by the
CWC. In the final analysis, however, it would appear that the CWC
can be implemented domestically in the United States, without
violation of Fourth Amendment rights under the Constitution. The
onus will be on the Congress to draft implementing legislation in
conformance with both the CWC and the Constitution.
Verification: A Central Concern.
Can the CWC verification regime provide absolute certainty
of compliance by all member states? The simple answer is no. In
fact, the U.S. intelligence community has indicated that it
cannot verify with complete confidence the declarations of states
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party to the CWC, nor their compliance with its provisions. Also,
the SFRC is concerned that clandestine production or stockpiling
could go undetected and thus expose U.S. troops to CW threat or
attack.89
However, without undertaking an exhaustive analysis of the
technical considerations involved in this issue, it is accurate
to say that the CWC has the most stringent verification regime
ever attempted in an international agreement.90 Furthermore, an
analysis of the CWC verification regime conducted in December
1991 by the Center for National Security Studies, Los Alamos
National Laboratory, concluded that the proposed regime should be
considered:
. . . as part of a larger security framework that
includes (1) national intelligence means, which provide
additional detection capabilities to those of the
multinational system; (2) defensive and protective
measures that can mitigate to some degree the risks of
treaty violation, whether detected or undetected; (3)
political, diplomatic, and military measures to deter
violations; and (4) confidence- and security-building
measures (e.g., notification and observation of
European military activities pursuant to the 1986
Stockholm Document).91
No arms control regime can ever be absolutely verifiable,
but CWC supporters believe that it provides an acceptable
measure of risk. John D. Holum, Director of the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), has stated that "the Convention
increases our odds of detecting clandestine activity," and, "by
putting into place a global legal norm outlawing possession as
well as use, it will increase the financial and political costs
of acquiring or retaining chemical weapons."92 In addition, the
CWC contains both incentives and disincentives, to reward
countries who comply and punish those who do not.93
In sum, while verification remains a justifiable concern,
the associated risks appear to fall within acceptable limits.
Rigorous enforcement of the verification regime will be required
throughout the life of the convention, to ensure compliance by
all states party. "Trust, but verify" was never a more
appropriate truism.
The Chemical Industry--What Does It Think?
A principal concern among CWC opponents is that it would be
prohibitively expensive and possibly threatening to the interests
of the U.S. chemical industry. It has been argued that treaty
costs of the CWC would be borne primarily by U.S. companies,
which would also incur excessive reporting requirements and work
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stoppages due to inspections. Operational costs of the
convention's OPCW would also impose additional costs on the U.S.
taxpayer.94
Proponents of the CWC make the counterargument that
excessive cost may not necessarily be the case. They point out
that the U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) has been
"an early and consistent supporter" of the CWC, and was in fact
awarded the fourth W. Averell Harriman Award in May 1995 for its
work in support of the convention. The CMA was instrumental in
mobilizing international support for the CWC, including the
support of the chemical industries of Western Europe, Canada,
Australia and Japan.95 Representatives of the CMA and the U.S.
chemical industry were also major participants in the Australia
Government-Industry Conference on Chemical Weapons held in
September 1989 in Canberra. Over the course of the negotiations,
the CMA and U.S. negotiators consulted regularly on the draft
text, and the CMA and foreign trade associations contributed
specifically to the verification regime of the convention.
The two areas of greatest concern to the chemical industry
have been the costs of compliance and the possibility of loss of
confidential business information. Given the industry's
significant role in drafting the treaty, the compliance costs are
expected to be "manageable," and can be integrated into the
normal cost of doing business.96
With respect to protection of proprietary information,
measures have been incorporated into the verification regime
which will provide a balance between the intrusiveness necessary
to verify compliance and the protection of legitimate trade
secrets. The "Managed Access" provisions of the treaty are a
direct result of CMA contributions to its drafting.97
Ultimately, the CMA, as the trade association representing
those in the private sector most affected by the CWC, has the
final say on whether or not the U.S. chemical industry supports
the treaty. CMA President Fred Webber has written, "Accepting new
regulations and opening up plants to inspectors isn't something
we agreed to lightly. But we've come to the conclusion that the
convention is a sound investment. It will yield solid returns at
a cost we can and will bear."98 Webber has further written that,
"Honest businesses have nothing to fear. Anyone with other
motives will run the risk of getting caught in the act. The
treaty is the best means available to prevent legitimate
chemicals from falling into the wrong hands."99
Treaty proponents further point out that many wealthy states
with large chemical industries, such as Japan, Germany,
Switzerland, and the Netherlands, have already ratified the
treaty.100 These countries, with their own chemical industries,
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are presumably no less aware than the United States of the risks
and costs of the CWC. That they have chosen to commit their
governments, industries, and peoples to the international
obligations of the CWC implies a decision that, on balance,
treaty benefits outweigh costs and risks. Having made the same
considerations, the U.S. CMA reached an identical conclusion and
publicly stated its own support for the CWC.
The CWC--Should the United States Ratify?
In the final analysis, yes. Although treaty opponents
present a strong case against, particularly on verification,
enforcement, and industry concerns, on balance the treaty is in
the U.S. national interest. Can the CWC be verified with absolute
confidence, and if violated, enforced effectively? No, it cannot
be verified with 100 percent confidence, any more than any other
treaty to which the United States is a party. However, it does
provide a rigorous, highly intrusive, and comprehensive
verification regime. This verification regime will make it
extremely difficult for any state or transnational entity to
produce, stockpile, weaponize, or employ chemical weapons, to the
extent that U.S. forces would be subject to significant threat or
would be significantly constrained from executing an operational
mission. This does not preclude a terrorist attack, such as the
1995 Tokyo subway attack. It also does rule out entirely isolated
incidents of tactical employment of CW. However, the CWC
verification regime will make such incidents prohibitively
difficult, and compel prospective violaters to channel their
aberrant energies and resources to courses of action other than
CW.
Can the treaty be enforced? Again, the enforcement regime
cannot guarantee absolute compliance, but it is extremely
rigorous, making provision for sanctions and other trade measures
against violators. In the inextricably interconnected and
interdependent global marketplace, the threat of trade sanctions
alone can be a particularly effective disincentive to the
clandestine production of chemical weapons or their use.
What about the impact on the chemical industry? Yes, the CWC
will impose additional reporting requirements and inspection
burdens on the industry, and this will entail additional costs.
But the U.S. chemical industry, and its major trading partners,
have expressed their support for the CWC and have explicitly
stated their ability and willingness to accept the burden and
operate effectively under it. There are also concerns about the
protection of proprietary information. Again, the U.S. Chemical
Manufacturers Association has indicated that the "Managed Access"
and other provisions of the treaty verification regime provide
sufficient confidence to the industry that confidential business
information will remain precisely "confidential."
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The destruction of existing CW stockpiles remains a
technological challenge, not only for the United States but for
Russia and for any other state on whose territory such stockpiles
exist. The issue then is whether such stocks represent a threat
to the integrity of the convention. However, all such stockpiles
must be declared, and remain subject to monitoring throughout the
destruction schedule. Even if that schedule is delayed or
extended for technological or financial reasons, the CW stocks
would be effectively denied to a potential violator. The
possibility of clandestine CW stockpiles not otherwise declared
is addressed in part by the treaty challenge inspection
provisions. Furthermore, significant tactical employment of
clandestine stocks would be severely constrained by the
requirement that they remain "clandestine." While the
verification regime cannot guarantee discovery of clandestine
stocks, the unique requirements for safe CW production,
containment, weaponization, deployment, employment, and
ultimately decontamination by a potential treaty violator would
be particularly susceptible to a host of national technical and
other means of detection.
Will the CWC lower the "nuclear threshold," in the absence
of a CW retaliatory capability? Even in Global Wargame 1995,
where nuclear retaliation was recommended in response to CW
attack, the notional national command authorities withheld
approval. In the real world, the United States and its allies
disavowed any chemical or nuclear option in the Gulf War. Given
demonstrated U.S. and Western abhorence for chemical weapons, it
is very unlikely that CW retaliation would be an option in the
future, even if a CW capability existed. Does this imply that the
only other recourse is nuclear? It did not in the Gulf War, where
the United States declared from the outset that any such use
would be met by "disproportionate response." The U.S.
conventional capability, particularly in precision guided
munitions and related technology, remains unequalled, and has
been demonstrated to provide the United States a massive,
effective, and flexible deterrent and retaliatory option. Nuclear
retaliation to CW use does not appear to be the only viable
option.
Ultimately, perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the
CWC is that the United States has already abrogated any possible
CW capability, retaliatory or otherwise. All moral or legal
considerations aside, the United States has unilaterally
committed by law to the complete destruction of its own CW
stockpile. Further, the United States has disavowed a CW
retaliatory option, once the CWC enters into force, but this is a
moot point given practical constraints on U.S. CW production and
deployment. The United States has undertaken these commitments on
its own, without a treaty in place. On balance, the United States
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can only gain by imposing the same constraints, burdens, and
respon-sibilities on the rest of the international community. The
final conclusion then must be that it is in the U.S. national
strategic interest to ratify the CWC. The Senate should be
encouraged to provide its advice and consent at the earliest
possible date.
The Strategic Implications for the United States.
The United States must recognize that the CWC does not imply
an end to the CW threat. If anything, the CWC requires a greater
commitment to defensive measures, including detection, training,
equipment, decontamination, and research. This will have the dual
result of both protecting U.S. personnel and rendering obsolete
or ineffective CW use by an adversary. U.S. conventional
capabilities must likewise be enhanced to provide that
"disproportionate response" which will act as both deterrent and
retaliation to hostile CW employment. Defense budgets must
reflect an undiminished commitment to a strong and viable CW
defensive and conventional deterrent capability.
On the political level, the United States and its allies
must continue to coordinate their activities within the
organization of the CWC and within the Australia Group to monitor
and/or control the flow of precursor chemicals in world commerce.
International pressures must be brought to bear on nonsignatories to accede to the treaty, and on signatories to
comply. Potential violators must be made aware of the
transparency of their actions and of the consequences of
violation. In the event of armed conflict, potential adversaries
must have no doubt that chemical weapons use or threat of use
will invite the most massive and focused response against the
person, personnel and resources of the perpetrator.
Finally, perhaps the most important "strategic implication"
for the United States is that it must become totally committed to
the CWC and take a major leadership role in its implementation.
This will require a significant commitment to the OPCW, in terms
of finances, resources and personnel. Only by its active and
aggressive participation, can the United States ensure that the
verification and enforcement regimes of the treaty are fully
implemented, and that controls and protective measures for
industry are adequately applied. Imperfect though it may be, the
CWC represents a major step forward in arms control, but the
utility of it resides with the world community. The ultimate
proof will be in the unreserved commitment of signatories and
non-signatories equally and alike to the international standards
of behavior embodied by the convention.
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